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THE SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES SIMPLIFICADA: 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM OF MEXICO’S 
FIRST UNIPERSONAL LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY 
 
Laura K. Daugherty† 
 
Abstract:  Mexico introduced its first unipersonal limited liability entity in 2016, 
the Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (“SAS”).1  The introduction of Mexico’s SAS is 
in line with legal development in Latin America as a whole, where there has been a recent 
trend towards introducing new unipersonal limited liability entities that are specially 
designed to reduce barriers to entry for burgeoning business owners and ease the 
requirements of owning a business entity.  However, the Mexican SAS as it currently exists 
is uniquely overly restrictive.  To remedy this, some of the current restrictions on the entity 
should be lifted to facilitate the functionality of the entity.  Particularly considered for 
further reform are the five-million-peso total annual income cap, bar on SAS entities 
having juridical person shareholders, and bar on SAS entities having shareholders who are 
controlling shareholders in another Mexican entity.  The excessive restrictiveness of the 
Mexican SAS entity is illustrated from three perspectives: legislative intent, rule of law, 
and comparative law. 
 
Cite as:  Laura K. Daugherty, The Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada: Suggestions for 
Further Reform of Mexico’s First Unipersonal Limited Liability Entity, 27 WASH. INT’L 
L.J. 743 (2018). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, or General Law for 
Commercial Corporations (“LGSM”),2 is the legal code that governs the types 
of juridical entity structures available in Mexico.  In March 2016, Mexico 
reformed the LGSM to include the Soceidad por Acciones Simplificada, or 
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to thank María José Pérez, attorney at law, for her help in reviewing the statute translation and Comment 
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1 The author notes that this Comment regularly cites directly from Spanish-language sources without 
providing indication that the quotation is a translation. All translations (and errors) are by the author. 
2 Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM], cap. XIV, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 
04-08-1934, últimas reformas DOF 24-01-2018 (Mex.), formato PDF, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ 
LeyesBiblio/pdf/144_240118.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
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simplified joint stock company (“SAS”).3  The SAS is a type of unipersonal4 
limited liability business entity intended to allow owners and operators to 
insulate themselves from personal liability from their business investment.5  
Unlike other Mexican business entities, the SAS does not automatically 
dissolve when owned by only one shareholder, but rather can be formed and 
perpetually owned by a single individual.6 
 
The Mexican SAS is an example of the development of unipersonal 
entities in the civil law tradition, particularly the Latin American civil law 
tradition.  Such unipersonal limited liability entities are currently in vogue in 
the region, as they have been introduced by multiple other Latin American 
countries and encouraged by international organizations.  The SAS is, at its 
core, an entity designed for use by startups.  In order to limit the SAS to this 
group, the SAS is subject to many unique restrictions.  In Mexico, the SAS 
has proved controversial, with detractors arguing that the entity is risky and 
regressive, while proponents argue that it eliminates bureaucratic hurdles to 
foster entrepreneurial innovation.  In all, the SAS is the latest innovation in 
Latin American business entity law, and its unique position as a startup entity 
can both support its existence and fuel its critics. 
  
While the SAS represents a great step forward in the modernization of 
Mexican commercial law, with further reform the SAS could do more to aid 
its principle goal of stimulating the Mexican economy through buoying new 
business owners.  Such reform would be consistent with the design of 
unipersonal entities in other Latin American countries.  This Comment looks 
to legislative intent, rule of law theory, and a comparative analysis with a 
selection of similarly situated Latin American countries to make a 
multifaceted case for such further reform.  Primarily, an important goal of the 
SAS is to foster economic growth in Mexico.  The Mexican SAS may better 
foster economic growth if some of the unique restrictions currently imposed 
on the entity were loosened or eliminated.  Additionally, the current law 
necessitates reform because it lacks clarity and therefore may be difficult for 
                                                     
3 Translated from “sociedad por acciones simplificada.” Id. art. 1, frac. VII. For the original SAS 
reform, see Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley General de 
Sociedades Mercantiles, DOF 14-3-2016. 
4 A “unipersonal” entity is one that a sole shareholder can own, although there may be additional 
shareholders. This Comment uses “unipersonal” to refer both to entities that can be formed by a sole 
shareholder and those that must be formed by multiple shareholders, but do not dissolve or lose limited 
liability protection upon a reduction to one shareholder. 
5 See LGSM cap. XIV. 
6 Id. art. 260. 
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some targeted business owners to follow.  Finally, such reform would not be 
unprecedented, as looking to other similarly situated Latin American 
countries shows that the restrictions in question are in fact unique to the 
Mexican SAS.  Mexican SAS reform should look to the models of other Latin 
American countries, as these jurisdictions may offer hints for how Mexico can 
preserve a true startup entity form without hampering growth for businesses 
that choose to form as an SAS.  Principally, Mexico should consider removing 
unique restrictions such as the income cap currently imposed on an SAS entity 
and loosening restrictions on who may be an SAS shareholder. 
 
There is limited English-language scholarship available on the 
development of the SAS and related limited liability business entities in Latin 
America, and even less in the Mexican context.  This Comment seeks to bring 
the conversation surrounding the Mexican SAS entity into English-language 
scholarship.  Knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of this entity type 
may be useful for those who wish to do business in Mexico.  Additionally, 
this Comment hopes to interact with ongoing debates within Latin America 
about how to structure new unipersonal entities and stimulate startups.  Finally, 
the themes presented here regarding thoughtful proliferation of new entity 
forms and regulation of startup businesses, though analyzed in the Latin 
American context, are applicable to law reform efforts worldwide. 
 
As the first Mexican limited liability entity that can be owned by a 
single shareholder, the SAS is a step in the right direction.  However, Mexico 
should loosen its restrictions on the entity in order to create a more 
economically useful and enduring entity structure.  In support of this claim, 
Part II provides background on the historical development of unipersonal 
limited liability entities in Latin America, explains what is unique about the 
SAS, and outlines Mexican perspectives on the introduction of the SAS 
entity—both in favor and against.  Part III analyzes the legislative intent 
behind the SAS implementation to illustrate that it would be better served by 
a less restrictive structure, provides theoretical arguments against the 
restrictive nature of the Mexican SAS from the perspective of rule of law 
theory, and demonstrates the restrictiveness of the Mexican SAS when 
compared to other similarly situated Latin American countries.  Part IV 
concludes by providing thoughts on how Mexico may further reform its 
commercial law in this context. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
  
The Mexican SAS entity did not materialize from thin air.  Long before 
the introduction of the Mexican SAS, unipersonal limited liability entities 
entered and developed in the civil law tradition.  While the SAS is unique to 
Mexico, it arises from this same legal school.  However, despite the heritage 
of unipersonal limited liability entities in the Latin American civil law 
tradition, the Mexican SAS has been met with both praise and critique.  This 
Part grounds the SAS to Mexico by providing context surrounding:  1) the 
development of unipersonal limited liability entities in the Latin American 
civil law tradition; 2) what exactly is unique about the SAS in the Mexican 
context; and 3) how Mexican commentators and stakeholders have reacted to 
the introduction of the SAS entity. 
 
A. Development of Unipersonal Limited Liability Entities in the 
Latin American Civil Law Tradition 
 
The proliferation of SAS-type entities in Latin America can be seen as 
the most recent event in a chain of developments originating from the civil 
law tradition.  Limited liability theory came to Latin America through the 
Western European continental civil law tradition.7  While there were some 
exceptions, 8  shareholder liability was generally unlimited in continental 
Europe until the time of the French Revolution.  In the 1780s, many French 
companies began including limited liability clauses in their charters, and in 
1807 the French Commercial Code was modified to provide limited liability 
for joint stock companies.  The French codification of limited liability 
followed Napoleon—notably into the Spanish Civil Code of 1829 and from 
Spain to Latin America.9 
  
While limited liability entities were recognized in the civil law tradition 
in the nineteenth century, unipersonal limited liability entities did not come 
about until later.  The first country to allow for unipersonal limited liability 
                                                     
7 Dante Figueroa, Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin 
America, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 683, 699 (2012). 
8 Notably, the French East India Company, which was founded in 1664. Id. at 699. 
9 Id. at 699–700. 
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entities was Liechtenstein in 1925,10 and the first country in Latin America to 
do so was Costa Rica in 1961.11 
  
Currently, Latin America is in the midst of a new wave of limited 
liability law reform.  The introduction of unipersonal limited liability entities 
was intended to make these entities more accessible to new business owners 
through reduced barriers to entry12 and simplification of corporate formalities, 
among other aspects.13  These new entities have been described as a blend of 
the civil law tradition that predominates in Latin America and the common 
law tradition.  Rather than adhering strictly to established positive standards 
for corporate entities, as is the norm in Latin American civil law jurisdictions, 
such entities provide flexible solutions reflecting the “economic needs of 
common business people.”14  This law reform movement comes as part of a 
recent trend in Latin America to simplify company legislation in pursuit of 
economic prosperity.  In contrast, the previous norm in the region was to have 
the same types of legal structure and incorporation processes available for all 
types of businesses, “regardless of the business’ size or stage of 
development.”15  In sum, while it is a departure from the historical Latin 
American norm, decreasing rigidity is intended to increase the accessibility of 
entity formation in order to encourage formal formation of businesses that 
otherwise may not have registered or existed. 
 
Such legal reform efforts have been encouraged by international 
organizations.  The Organization of American States (“OAS”) adopted a 
Model Law on Simplified Corporations in June 2017, 16  and the United 
                                                     
10 Aramouni, Alberto, “Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada,” Revista de Derecho 
Privado [RDP], vol. 8, 1992, p. 196, formato PDF, https://revistas-colaboracion.juridicas.unam.mx/ 
index.php/rev-derecho-privado/article/view/20088/18021 (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
11 See CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [CÓD. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] tit. I, cap. VII (Costa Rica), 
https://costarica.eregulations.org/media/codigo%20de%20comercio.pdf (providing amendment dates 
indicating the duration of the law) [hereinafter CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica)]. Note that the ability of a Sociedad 
Anónima to survive as a unipersonal entity and the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada 
unipersonal entity structure are both included in the original version of the law. Id. 
12 Via features such as online registration systems and reduced minimum capital and registration costs. 
See infra Table 1. 
13 See Francisco Reyes, The Colombian Simplified Corporation: A Proposed Model for Developing 
Jurisdictions, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 114 (2016). 
14 Id. 
15 Rodrigo Novoa Urenda, The Latin American Contribution to a Model Law of Simplified Companies, 
33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 167 (2015). 
16 Org. of Am. States [OAS], General Assembly Res. 2906 (XLVII-O/17), annex, Model Act on the 
Simplified Stock Corporation (June 20, 2017), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/Model_Law_on_the_ 
Simplified_Corporation.pdf; see also Francisco Reyes Villamizar, The Organization of American States’ 
Model Law on Simplified Corporations, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/ 
business-law-blog/blog/2017/09/organization-american-states-model-law-simplified-corporations (noting 
748                              WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 3 
 
 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Working 
Group on Micro-, Small-, and Medium-sized Enterprises is likewise 
developing model laws on simplified and single-member business entities and 
legislative guides on key principles of a business registry and limited liability 
organizations.17 
 
As of writing, such simplified and easily accessible entities have been 
adopted in four Latin American countries18:  Chile, adopting its Sociedad por 
Acciones (joint stock company) (“Chilean SpA”) in 2007; 19  Colombia, 
adopting its Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (simplified joint stock 
company) (“Colombian SAS”) in 2008;20 Mexico, adopting its Sociedad por 
Acciones Simplificada (simplified joint stock company) in 2015; 21  and 
Argentina, adopting its Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (simplified joint 
stock company) (“Argentine SAS”) in 2017.22  Brazil also has a bill that has 
been pending since 2012 to create a Sociedade Anônima Simplificada, or 
simplified joint stock company (“Brazilian SAS”).23  Therefore, while the 
Mexican SAS is unique in many ways, Mexico is not alone in its current law 
reform efforts.  In fact, it is one of many Latin American countries embracing 
the idea that providing an accessible startup entity type, though a departure 
from the Latin American legal tradition, may prove beneficial to economic 
development. 
 
                                                     
that the OAS’s Model Law is based on the Colombian Sociedad de Acciones Simplificada, which has been 
very successful); OAS, Inter-Am. Judicial Comm. Res 188 (LXXX-O/12) corr.1, Project For A Model Act 
On Simplified Corporation (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/CJI-doc_380-11_corr2.pdf 
(approving the OAS project to develop the model law in 2012); Model Law on the Simplified Stock 
Corporation, OAS DEP’T INT’L L.: NEWSLETTER (July 2017), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/newsletter_ 
Model_Law_Simplified_Corporation_Report_Jul-2017.html (describing the Model Law). 
17 See generally Working Group I: 2014 to Present: Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, U.N. 
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L. [UNCITRAL], http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/ 
working_groups/1MSME.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2018) (listing all of the records of the working group). 
18 Reyes Villamizar, supra note 16 (providing an overview of the legal developments in Latin America 
as well as the OAS Model Law). 
19 Law No. 20190, Introduce Adecuaciones Tributarias e Institucionales para el Fomento de la 
Industria de Capital de Riesgo y Continua el Proceso de Modernizacion del Mercado de Capitales, Junio 5, 
2007, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/N?i=261427&f=2007-06-05 [hereinafter 
Law No. 20190 Chile]. 
20 L. 1258, diciembre 5, 2008, [No. 47.194] Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.), 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_1258_2008.html. 
21 LGSM cap. XIV. 
22 Law No. 27349, Mar. 29, 2017, [33604] B.O. 1 (Arg.), http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/ 
infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=273567 [hereinafter Ley 27349 Argentina]. 
23 For a Brazilian government website showing the bill’s progress, see Projetos de Lei e Outras 
Proposições: PL 4303/2012, CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/ 
fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=553029 (last visited Mar. 30, 2018) (“Altera a Lei no. 6.404, de 15 de 
dezembro de 1976, para criar e disciplinar a sociedade anônima simplificada (SAS).”). 
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B. An Overview:  What Is the SAS? 
 
The Mexican SAS is essentially a reworking of traditional Mexican 
entity forms intended to make it easier for new business owners to form and 
run a business while still fitting into the overarching Mexican commercial 
legal framework.  The key ways that the SAS is unique within Mexican law 
are that it is the only Mexican limited liability commercial entity that can be 
owned by a single shareholder;24 it can be incorporated in a single day via an 
online system; 25  its formation does not require the services of a public 
notary;26 and there is no requirement to set aside a legal reserve from the 
annual net profits.27 
 
The statement of legislative intent backing the new law explains that 
the goal of the SAS is to facilitate the creation of new businesses in Mexico—
without sacrificing legal security—in order to foster job creation, healthy 
economic growth, and market competitiveness through new and better 
services and market prices, which in turn are to produce economic and societal 
stability.28  The legal reform is targeted at youths and entrepreneurs who seek 
to start a business but are challenged by the excessive and inhibitive legal 
complexity of forming a business in Mexico.29  Likewise, the law addresses 
                                                     
24 LGSM art. 260. 
25 Id. art. 262, frac. II. For the statement of intent or “Exposición de Motivos” of the SAS law, see 
Iniciativa con Proyecto de Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley 
General de Sociedades Mercantiles, del Código de Comercio, y del Código Fiscal de la Federación, 9 de 
diciembre de 2014, in Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General 
de Sociedades Mercantiles, pt. 1, p. 2, DOF 14-03-2016, formato PDF, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/Prog_leg_LXIII/031_DOF_14mar16.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Exposición de Motivos]; see also ¿Qué es una Sociedad por Acciones 
Simplificada—SAS?, GOB.MX: TU EMPRESA BLOG, (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.gob.mx/tuempresa/ 
articulos/que-es-una-sas. 
26 See LGSM art. 263, frac. VI; Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 2. 
27 In Mexico, all business entities, except for the SAS, must annually set aside five percent of their net 
profits as a legal reserve until the reserve fund is equal to twenty percent of the share capital of the 
organization, after which the reserve must be maintained at twenty percent. See LGSM art. 20. 
28 Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
29 While this will be touched on throughout, such inhibitive requirements include, for example, the 
necessity of using a notary public to form a company; the cost of forming a company, which may be 
prohibitive to many would-be entrepreneurs in Mexico; the time required to form a company through a notary 
public; strict corporate governance norms that may be difficult for small companies to comply with; and the 
necessity of setting aside a “legal reserve” up to twenty percent of the share capital of the organization. See 
generally LGSM (providing the regulations governing commercial entity forms available in Mexico and 
throughout requiring the types of restrictions outlined here); see also Ease of Doing Business in Mexico, 
DOING BUS., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/mexico#starting-a-business#mexico-
city (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (quoting an incorporation time in Mexico City for a Sociedad Anónima, a 
standard Mexican entity type, at 8.5 days and noting that the costs of incorporation would be about 18.2% of 
the standard income per capita). 
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Mexico’s unregistered informal economy30—people who may be experienced 
business owners, but who have not gone through formal business formation 
procedures.31  The law is intended to create an alternative to traditional entity 
types and formation procedures available only to entry-level businesses and 
businesspeople where the costs of a public notary and the time needed for 
administrative procedures are not merited.32  In this sense, the law can be seen 
as a transitory entity for businesses to use only in the beginning phases of their 
operation.33 
 
As a unique entity, the SAS carries unique restrictions.  Only natural 
persons can be shareholders in SAS entities,34 which means that the SAS 
cannot have any corporate shareholders, let alone sell shares to a venture 
capital firm for startup funding or serve as a subsidiary.  Perhaps more 
stringently, the natural person shareholders of a SAS cannot be controlling 
shareholders of any other Mexican legal entity.35  So, an entrepreneur could 
not maintain more than one SAS for different businesses.  Additionally, SAS 
entities are capped at a total annual income of $5 million MXN 
(approximately $250,000 USD),36 after which they must either transform into 
a different entity structure—all of which require more than one shareholder—
or lose their limited liability protection.37  The reference in the statute to “total 
annual income” does not specify whether this refers to gross income, net 
income, income before taxes, or income after taxes.38 
                                                     
30 Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 1. 
31 In Mexico, there is a large sector particularly consisting of micro and small businesses that is 
commonly known as the “informal economy.” This term refers to businesses that are not officially formed or 
registered and that generally do not pay taxes. It is also known as the “shadow economy.” A common example 
is many of Mexico’s prolific street vendors. See Sergio Peña, Informal Markets: Street Vendors in Mexico 
City, 23 HABITAT INT’L 363, 365–67 (1999) (explaining generally what the informal economy is in the 
context of street vendors in Mexico City); Krista Hughes, Mexico Aims to Bring Shadow Economy into the 
Light, REUTERS (June 26, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-economy-informal/mexico-
aims-to-bring-shadow-economy-into-the-light-idUSBRE95P09C20130626 (discussing the tax problems 
associated with Mexico’s informal economy). While not discussed in depth here, the SAS entity’s efficacy 
in actually registering the informal economy is an interesting question ripe for further study. 
32 Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 2. 
33 See Discución del Dictamen de las Comisiones Unidas de Comercio y Fomento Industrial, de 
Hacienda y Crédito Público, y de Estudios Legislativos, Segunda, con Proyecto de Decreto por el que Se 
Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, del Código de 
Comercio, y del Código Fiscal de la Federación, 09 de diciembre de 2015, in Decreto por el que Se Reforman 
y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, supra note 25, pt. 3 
[hereinafter Discución del Dictamen]. 
34 LGSM art. 260. 
35 Id. 
36 To be adjusted annually by regulation. Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
June 2018 The Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada 751 
 
Despite these restrictions, the uniquely simple and flexible SAS has 
been gaining traction in Mexico.  The Mexican Subsecretary of Normativity 
and Competitiveness of the Secretary of Economy reported that 7894 SAS 
entities were formed online between October 2016 and October 2017, the first 
year of SAS operation.  The Subsecretary further reported that the numbers 
have evened off, with about 1000 SAS entities registering every month.39  
While the SAS may be heavily restricted, its creation was certainly not a 
legislative error, as it already shows promising patterns of use by Mexican 
business owners. 
 
C. Mexican Perspectives on the SAS 
  
The SAS is not without controversy in Mexico.  While politically 
popular, SAS introduction has sparked everything from accolades to warnings 
of doom from commentators and stakeholders.  This section presents the 
legislative record of the SAS and arguments against introducing the SAS.  
Arguments against the SAS mainly focus on it being too liberal (rather than 
too restrictive), while arguments in favor are mainly from the entrepreneurial 
perspective. 
 
The legal reform that created the SAS was politically very popular in 
Mexico.  The bill passed in the Chamber of Senators with seventy-one votes 
in favor, two votes against, and two abstentions.  The bill likewise passed by 
high margins in the Chamber of Representatives,40 with 428 votes in favor, 
one against, and no abstentions. 41   However, there was still popular 
controversy over the bill and arguments both for and against the bill presented 
in the Mexican media.42  The two most vocal groups for and against the 
                                                     
39 Ivette Saldaña, En Primer Año de Empresas Exprés, Se Crean 7 Mil 894, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr. 12, 
2017), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/cartera/economia/en-primer-ano-de-empresas-expres-se-crean-7-
mil-894. 
40 In Mexico, both chambers of Congress—the Chamber of Senators and the Chamber of 
Representatives—must agree on the text of a bill for it to become law. See National Parliaments: Mexico, 
LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments/mexico.php (last updated Feb. 16, 
2016). 
41 Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de 
Sociedades Mercantiles, supra note 25, at 1. 
42 See, e.g., Raúl Contreras Bustamante, Sociedades por Acciones Simplificadas, EXCELSIOR (Mar. 19, 
2016), http://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/raul-contreras-bustamante/2016/03/19/1081829 (against the 
bill); Analiza Comisión de Comercio creación de la Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada, SENADO DE LA 
REPÚBLICA, (Nov. 26, 2015, 7:38 PM), http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/ 
boletines/25039-2015-11-27-01-40-47.html [hereinafter Analiza Comisión de Comercio] (for the bill); 
Xanath Lastiri, La Nueva Ley para Crear Empresas Pymes Guarda Riesgos para Ciudadanos, Critican 
Notarios, SIN EMBARGO (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:02 AM), http://www.sinembargo.mx/11-02-2016/1617823 
(against the bill); Laura Adriana Esparza García, Comentarios Jurídicos Sobre las Sociedades por Acciones 
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introduction of the SAS entity in Mexico were the Colegio Nacional del 
Notariado Mexicano (National College of Mexican Notaries) (“Notaries”) 
and the Associación de Emprendedores de México (Mexican Association of 
Entrepreneurs) (“ASEM”). 
  
The Notaries’ argument against the introduction of the SAS focused on 
two main concepts:  that the SAS was risky and that it was regressive.  The 
Notaries gave four reasons why the SAS was risky.  First, forming an SAS 
does not require any sort of identity corroboration in the moment of formation 
and depends only on presentation of an electronic signature to open the 
business.43  While people must go in person to the office of the Servicios de 
Administración Tributaria (Tax Administration Service) to obtain an 
electronic signature, once it has been obtained, it is located on a portable data 
storage device, such as a flash drive.  From that device, the signature could 
arguably be easily misappropriated.44  One journalist noted that this was a 
particular risk in Mexico, as Mexico has the third-highest rate of cybercrime 
in the world in terms of number of victims, with sixty-eight percent of such 
crimes being identity theft.45  The ability to use an electronic signature without 
additional verification also means that SAS entities could arguably be formed 
using nonexistent partners, dead partners, and partners without continuing 
legal capacity to consent.46  Second, the SAS law does not include any official 
mechanism for people to challenge that they gave consent to open a business 
in their name.47  Hypothetically, if someone’s identity were to be stolen and 
                                                     
Simplificadas, BCS ABOGADOS (May 19, 2016), http://bcsabogados.com/comentarios-juridicos-sobre-las-
sociedades-anonimas-simplificadas/ (both for and against the bill); Laura Vela, ‘Empresas en un Día y Costo 
Cero’, ¿En Verdad Beneficiaría a México?, DINERO EN IMAGEN (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://www.dineroenimagen.com/2016-01-20/67542 (both for and against the bill); Angélica Pineda, SAS 
Abren Puerta a Empresas Fantasmas, Advierten Notarios, EL EMPRESARIO (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://elempresario.mx/actualidad/sas-abren-puerta-empresas-fantasmas-advierten-notarios (both for and 
against the bill); Campus Mexicali, Explica Experta ‘Sociedades por Acciones Simplificada,’ VOCETYS 
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.cetys.mx/noticias/explica-experta-sociedades-por-acciones-simplificada/ 
(against the bill); Héctor Galeano Inclán, 4 Riesgos que Entraña Crear la Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada, 
FORBES (Mex.) (Feb. 2, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com.mx/4-riesgos-que-entrana-crear-la-
sociedad-por-acciones-simplificada/ (against the bill); Comisión Fiscal del Colegio de Contadores Públicos 
Universidad de Guadalajara, A.C., “Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada,” Fiscool Informativo, abril 2016, 
p. 5, formato PDF, http://www.ccpudg.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/4-FISCOOL-ABRIL-2016-Sociedad-
por-Acciones-Simplidficada.pdf [hereinafter Fiscool Informativo] (for the bill). 
43 El CNNM Presenta en Conferencia de Prensa su Postura ante la Creación de las Sociedades por 
Acciones Simplificada, COLEGIO NACIONAL DEL NOTARIADO MEXICANO, http://notariadomexicano.org.mx/ 
eventos/postura_ante_sociedad_acciones_simplificada.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) [hereinafter 
NOTARIADO MEXICANO]. 
44 Lastiri, supra note 42. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 NOTARIADO MEXICANO, supra note 43. 
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used to open an SAS online, the identity theft victim would have no official 
channel for recourse.  Third, as an SAS can be registered online without the 
traditional formalities required to open a business in Mexico, it creates a 
blinder potentially utilizable by those who wish to operate illicit businesses 
and commit crimes—particularly money laundering.48  Finally and similarly, 
the Notaries argued that the SAS was vulnerable to being taken advantage of 
by people who wished to form phantom and fraudulent businesses.49 
  
The Notaries also provided three arguments why the SAS law was 
regressive.  First, they argued that SAS registration was not truly free, but 
rather that the cost of registration is redistributed to all Mexican citizens 
instead of only those who actually wished to open a business.50  Second, all 
of the features of the SAS program were intended to help only one type of 
business owner rather than provide services for all types of business entities.51  
Lastly, and perhaps predictably from a notary professional organization, they 
argued that not using a professional notary in the course of entity formation 
increases the chances of making errors, which in turn can be costly to remedy 
after the fact.52  While the Notaries couched their arguments as claiming the 
SAS was regressive, in reality, many of their arguments were focused on 
maintaining the status quo, and with it the indispensability of notaries in the 
Mexican business-formation system.53 
  
Journalists and other commentators also made additional arguments 
against the SAS entity.  For example, one journalist commented that the SAS 
was not inherently Mexican, as it was from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition 
rather than the Roman-Germanic tradition of Mexico.54  The same journalist 
also opined that the utilization of an SAS could lead to conflicts between 
shareholders, lack of protection for entrepreneurial investment, lack of 
transparency in the administration of the company, violations of freedom of 
                                                     
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 While some of the arguments put forward by the Notaries require inference into how exactly the 
SAS would lead to these results, the Notaries did not flesh this out. In the spirit of reflecting Mexican 
perspectives rather than her own ideas, the author has not attempted to explain potential inferences. 
54 Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42. This argument is interesting in light of the fact that 
unipersonal limited liability entities have existed in the continental tradition for almost a century; Mexico is 
certainly not the first country to adopt this structure. See supra Part II.A. 
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contract, and loss of business opportunities.55  Additionally, many journalists 
argued that, in reality, the SAS entity does micro and small businesses no 
favors, as the true hurdle for such businesses is not incorporation, but rather 
surviving in the already highly competitive Mexican marketplace. 56  
Journalists also pointed out that from its inception, the SAS lacked analysis 
and specialized discussion in designing the reform; rather, it was a popular 
idea passed without proof that it would function in practice. 57   From a 
financial perspective, commentators also noted that because the SAS is 
exempt from the Mexican accounting requirement called the legal reserve, 
which requires businesses to set aside five percent of their earnings every year 
until they hit a twenty percent reserve, investing in such businesses would be 
risky for creditors.58  To the same sentiment, some banking industry players 
advertised that they were untrusting of SAS companies, and would be 
unwilling to provide them lines of credit or extend other benefits of the 
financial system.59  Notably, these were not empty threats, as banking issues 
have materialized for SAS owners.60  The sole common argument that the 
SAS did not go far enough to improve access for startup founders was that, 
even with the SAS entity, business founders are still required to go through 
the preexisting channels to secure a business name.61  The existing process to 
secure a business name can take from two to four days.62 
  
                                                     
55 Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42. However, the journalist did not explain the impetus behind 
these concerns. Rather, they can be seen to illustrate the general fear of SAS entity introduction by some 
Mexican commentators. 
56 See, e.g., Galeano Inclán, supra note 42 (noting that 75% of new Mexican businesses close before 
two years and 90% close before five years); Esparza García, supra note 42. 
57 Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42. 
58 Esparza García, supra note 42. 
59 Id. 
60 Access to banking has become a real problem for entrepreneurs who choose to form SAS entities. 
Legal representatives of SAS entities have difficulty proving that they are in fact the legal representatives 
because, unlike in traditional Mexican entities, their legal representative powers are not documented in a 
public deed. In traditional Mexican entities that are constituted before a notary public, the powers of the legal 
representative are granted before the notary and are therefore included in a public deed. As SAS entities are 
not constituted before a notary, this is not the case. When SAS legal representatives wish to open a bank 
account, the bank may not recognize their power as legal representatives of the entity, and they must then go 
before a notary to have their powers as legal representatives granted. The notary service costs approximately 
$8000 MXN (approx. $430 USD) and takes five days. While this Comment does not delve into this specific 
problem, it is one of the major shortcomings of the Mexican SAS legal reform. E-mail from María José Pérez, 
Assoc. Attorney at Law, Mier Esparza Abogados, S.C., to author (Mar. 23, 2018, 13:33 PST) (on file with 
author). 
61 Acosta, supra note 42.  
62 Id. Despite the critique, this does not appear to be a particularly burdensome restriction. However, 
this critique may be seen as indicative of the philosophy that SAS should be as minimally restrictive as 
possible. 
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The main proponent of the SAS bill was ASEM.  ASEM argued that 
the new law would help eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic processes and 
high costs for entrepreneurs and that it would promote the foundation of new 
businesses. 63   One figure published by ASEM touted that for every one 
thousand SAS entities formed, entrepreneurs would save $15 million MXN 
(approximately $800,000 USD) and fifty-five years of bureaucracy.64  Overall, 
ASEM supported and publicized the legal reform as a victory for Mexican 
entrepreneurs. 
  
Other arguments in favor of the bill include: that the SAS could serve 
as an incubator for new businesses, as it would be a useful tool for small and 
medium businesses to incorporate quickly and begin generating money under 
simpler operating conditions;65 the bill met the criteria of the United Nations 
Commission for International Business Development and Organization of 
American States guidelines;66 in practice many Mexican businesses already 
had only one “true” shareholder, so there was no reason for the law not to 
reflect this reality;67 introduction of the SAS could help Mexico rise in the 
World Bank Doing Business Rankings by reducing the time to form a 
business; 68  SAS formation avoids unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles; 69 
forming an SAS can save founders up to $12,000 MXN (approximately $650 
USD) over a traditional entity form;70 and the SAS law is a pro-competitive 
and pro-economic development, among other arguments.71 
  
Advocates of the SAS offered counterarguments for many of the points 
raised by the SAS detractors.  Generally, the comments of the Notaries were 
shrugged off as an example of protectionist fear-mongering on the part of 
notaries who wanted to preserve their profession’s integral position in 
                                                     
63 ¡Entró en Vigor la Ley para Crear Empresas en un Día y Sin Costo!, ASOCIACIÓN DE 
EMPRENDEDORES DE MÉXICO (Sept. 15, 2016), https://asem.mx/entro-en-vigor-la-ley-para-crear-empresas-
en-un-dia-y-sin-costo/. 
64 Mexicanos ‘Darán el Grito’ con Constitución de Empresas en 24 Horas, EXPANSIÓN (Sept. 13, 
2016, 7:45 PM), https://expansion.mx/emprendedores/2016/09/13/mexicanos-daran-el-grito-con-
constitucion-de-empresas-en-24-horas. 
65 Analiza Comisión de Comercio, supra note 42 (noting that micro and small businesses account for 
74.7% of brute production and 71% of jobs in Mexico, whereas 70% of micro and small businesses close 
within two years in Mexico). 
66 Fiscool Informativo, supra note 42. 
67 Esparza García, supra note 42. 
68 Fiscool Informativo, supra note 42. 
69 Vela, supra note 42. 
70 Pineda, supra note 42. Other sources put the cost differential of traditional entity formation higher 
than $12,000 MXN. See, e.g., Lastiri, supra note 42 (noting that producing the corporate charter alone could 
cost $10,000–20,000 MXN). 
71 Esparza García, supra note 42. 
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business formation.72  More particularly, in response to the argument that the 
SAS could easily be used for illicit purposes, SAS proponents pointed out that 
many businesses traditionally formed in front of notaries are already used for 
illicit purposes.  On this point, they noted that businesses are still required to 
get state-level licenses and permits where they are subject to scrutiny.  They 
further argued that even without licenses and permits, when business owners 
go to open a checking account, for example, there are already procedures in 
place to prevent money laundering.73  In reality, any risk of using the entity 
for illicit dealings is not fairly limited to the SAS or as unrestrained as its 
detractors might illustrate. 
  
At its core, the argument over the Mexican SAS is one between those 
who wish to preserve the status quo and those who see introduction of a 
simplified entity as an avenue for economic growth.  The vast majority of the 
arguments against the SAS state that it is too risky and extreme of a change 
for Mexico.  Many of these arguments center on fears that disrupting 
traditional business entity formation processes could have collateral 
consequences for business owners, clients, and unassociated third parties by 
removing too many fail-safes from the entity formation process.  On the other 
hand, the arguments in favor of the SAS entity tout the convenience and 
accessibility it provides to entrepreneurs as a source of economic growth in 
Mexico. 
 
In the spirit of the SAS advocates, this Comment takes the position that 
further change and relaxation could lead to increased business development 
in Mexico.  While certainly a big step for Mexico, Mexico was not the first 
Latin American country to reexamine traditional entity formation procedures 
and introduce a SAS-type entity.  Bringing the Mexican SAS closer to the 
models of other similarly situated Latin American countries could foster 
business creation and further enhance the simplicity of SAS use for the 
everyday owner.  This would, in turn, further the objectives touted by pro-
SAS commentators as the goals of the entity.  The remainder of this Comment 
will focus on elucidating these arguments through analysis of legislative intent, 
application of rule of law theory, and a comparative look at other similarly 
situated Latin American countries. 
 
 
                                                     
72 Vela, supra note 42. 
73 Analiza Comisión de Comercio, supra note 42. 
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III. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE MEXICAN SAS 
 
 Beyond the frame of the Mexican arguments for and against the SAS, 
there is a third position calling for a further rollback of SAS regulations.  The 
SAS entity would benefit from a continued relaxation of restrictions because:  
1) the SAS law as it stands is inconsistent with the goals emphasized in its 
legislative intent; 2) as articulated under rule of law theory, the stringency of 
the current restrictions undermines the clarity and ease of compliance with the 
SAS law; and 3) comparative analysis with other similarly situated Latin 
American jurisdictions demonstrates that the Mexican SAS is uniquely 
restrictive. 
 
A. Legislative Intent Analysis:  Reform of the Mexican SAS Could 
Further Its Goals of Aiding Economic Development via New 
Business in Mexico 
  
Mexican SAS law should be revised to be less restrictive because less 
restrictive norms would be conducive to the legislative intent behind the 
introduction of the entity.  In Mexico, the Exposición de Motivos, or 
“Statement of [Legislative] Intent,” of a law is not considered a source for 
legal interpretation, but it is useful for understanding the goals of the 
legislature in enacting a law.74  In this sense, the Statement of Legislative 
Intent for the Mexican SAS reform bill provides insight into what the law is 
intended to address. 
  
The Statement of Legislative Intent for the SAS75 makes clear that the 
new law was envisioned to facilitate the creation and formalization of new 
businesses, particularly for youths, entrepreneurs, and the informal 
economy. 76   It does so by simplifying the incorporation process through 
providing a free, electronic system that can be utilized without the assistance 
of a public notary,77 as the types of basic businesses envisioned should not 
                                                     
74 See González Oropeza, Manuel, “La Interpretación Jurídica en México,” Isonomía: Revista de 
Teoría y Filosofía del Derecho, núm. 5, octubre de 1996, pp. 65, 72–73. 
75 The SAS law was initially envisioned as a modification to the existing variable capital Sociedad de 
Responsabilidad Limitada, but it was ultimately enacted as a new entity type. See Exposición de Motivos, 
supra note 25, at 2. 
76 Id. at 1. 
77 As of July 7, 2017, the electronic system was still in development to add services at the federal, 
state, and municipal levels, and had cost $8,280,747.36 MXN (approximately $440,000 USD). Letter from 
Andrés Alejandro Pérez Frías, Agogado General de la Secretaría de Economía y Titular de la Unidad de 
Transparencia, to author (July 9, 2017) (on file with author) (Mexican Secretary of Economy responding to 
a data transparency request by the author). 
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require costly and time-consuming expert intervention.78   The minutes of 
legislative discussion on the introduction of the entity also illustrate that it was 
intended as a transitory entity, fixed as such by the $5 million MXN income 
cap.  Its transitory entity status is intended to reflect that, on a global level, 
four out of five start-up businesses fail.79 
  
The resulting law does not necessarily reflect these goals.  However, 
making the legislative framework less restrictive could work to further these 
goals.  First, aiding budding microenterprises, while placing burdens on 
businesses that grow, is not necessarily the best way to foster economic 
growth in Mexico.  Second, the current SAS law serves to delay the burden of 
costly and administratively difficult traditional business entity formation that 
requires the inclusion of additional shareholders. This creates a perverse 
incentive not to grow a small business past the SAS income-cap limit, to lie 
about SAS incomes, or, in the case of a truly solely-owned company, to find 
a sham partner to go forward with entity conversion.  Third, under creditor-
monitoring theory, as defined within, facilitating subsidiary creation and 
allowing ownership of more than one SAS, which the current SAS law does 
not permit, minimize creditor-monitoring costs and therefore foster economic 
growth.  Finally, limiting SAS shareholders to natural persons (rather than 
also allowing juridical persons80 as shareholders) may limit the economic 
growth the law seeks to create because it complicates early funding for start-
up businesses. 
 
1. The Income Cap Is Arbitrary and Counterproductive to 
Economic Growth 
  
While research has shown that lowering the barriers to entry increases 
business-formation rates in Mexico,81 the simple creation of additional micro 
and small businesses is not necessarily the most effective way to foster 
noticeable economic growth in Mexico.  While the growth of such enterprises 
does serve an important social-inclusion function, Álvaro Rodriguez Arregui 
posits that it would require adding 273,000 new microenterprises to the 
Mexican economy to achieve one percentage point growth of the gross 
                                                     
78 Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 2. 
79 Discución del Dictamen, supra note 33, at 2. 
80 “Juridical persons” refers to legal entities, as opposed to natural persons or individuals. 
81 See Miriam Bruhn, License to Sell: The Effect of Business Registration Reform on Entrepreneurial 
Activity in Mexico, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 382, 382 (2011) (using micro-level data to perform a statistical 
analysis and finding that a previous reform simplifying business entity formation in Mexico increased the 
number of registered businesses by 5% and increased wage employment by 2.2%). 
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domestic product (“GDP”), while the same growth could be achieved from 
growing 105 midsize companies into large companies.82  That is in no way to 
say that it is not valuable to foster the growth and creation of micro and small 
enterprises in Mexico; rather, it demonstrates that it is particularly valuable to 
provide continued support and reduce the barriers to growth that these 
businesses face as they scale up.83  Here, the income cap makes the SAS a 
transitory entity not intended to grow with the new businesses.  So, while the 
Mexican SAS reduces barriers to entry for new businesses, it only helps these 
businesses at the point where they make the smallest contribution to the 
national economy, but does not aid them in stages where their growth could 
have a more noticeable effect.  In fact, by forcing a conversion to a traditional 
entity as the business grows, the SAS burdens businesses with the same 
barriers that it initially removed. 
 
A counterargument to the point that the SAS would be more useful were 
it not transitory by design is that the lower thresholds for SAS incorporation 
necessarily mandate that the entity itself carry more restrictions than 
traditional entities in order to prevent misuse.  In this sense, allowing SAS 
entities to be used by any business in any stage would ignore that the unique 
features of the SAS are particularly tailored to micro, small, and start-up 
businesses.  Put simply, if the legislature had intended that any business of 
any size and stage of development could be an SAS, it would have simply 
reformed the traditional entity types to permit a sole shareholder or owner. 
 
This counterargument is overshadowed by the apparent arbitrariness of 
the $5 million MXN cap.  As noted above, one argument against SAS 
implementation is that SAS reform lacked analysis and specialized discussion 
in designing the reform.84  This is illustrated in the case of the income cap.  
The legislative history indicates that this cap was put in place due to fear of 
small business failure.85  However, this result does not logically follow.  If a 
business has shown solid growth from a new company to one meeting the 
                                                     
82 Álvaro Rodríguez Arregui, Mexico’s Growth Will Come from Entrepreneurship and Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises, 7 INNOVATIONS 1, 4 (2012), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/ 
10.1162/INOV_a_00110. 
83 As noted above, one of the goals of the legislation was to increase registration of the already existent 
informal economy. See supra Part II.B. However, past research on Mexico has shown that while former wage 
earners are more likely to open a new business because of barrier reduction, unregistered business owners 
are not more likely to register their business. See Bruhn, supra note 81, at 382. This is therefore an additional 
reason why it makes more sense to focus on also helping new businesses as they grow rather than to simply 
try to increase registration. 
84 Contreras Bustamante, supra note 42. 
85 Discusión del Dictamen, supra note 33, at 2. 
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income cap, such a business should be less likely to fail rather than more likely.  
Therefore, by the time businesses reach the income cap, following the logic 
of the business failure risk, it does not seem pertinent to test their further 
potential for success by forcing conversion.  Rather, such a business should 
be encouraged to continue growing by providing ongoing access to more 
lenient structures where it can continue its successful corporate governance as 
developed.  The SAS would be more conducive to economic growth were it 
reformed to likewise reduce barriers for businesses as they grow.  This could 
occur through total elimination of barriers such as the income cap or through 
some other form of graduated, thoughtfully reasoned restrictions that grow 
with the company. 
 
2. The Income Cap Incentivizes “Bad Behavior” by SAS 
Owners 
  
As the SAS delays the monetary and administrative burdens associated 
with forming a traditional business entity in Mexico until the point where the 
business reaches the income cap, this could potentially incentivize businesses 
to limit or control growth as to reduce the need for conversion or misreport 
total annual incomes to keep them below the SAS threshold—especially in 
the case of a one-time windfall.  It could also incentivize true sole business 
owners to find sham shareholders or partners to allow for conversion.  This is 
because the other limited liability entity types available in Mexico, the 
Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, or Limited Liability Company 
(“SdRL”), 86  Sociedad Anónima, or Corporation (“SA”), 87  and Sociedad 
Cooperativa, or Cooperative Society (“SC”), 88  all require at least two 
shareholders or partners.89  However, none of these laws have a minimum 
capital-per-shareholder requirement.90  This means it is entirely possible, and 
in fact common practice,91 to have a true owner of the business who holds the 
majority of the capital, while another person, such as a family member, could 
hold as little as one peso of capital.  Rather than allow for sham associations 
                                                     
86 LGSM cap. IV. 
87 Id. cap. V. 
88 Id. art. 1, frac. IV; id. cap. VII; Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas [LGSC], DOF 03-08-1993, 
últimas reformas 13-08-2009, formato PDF, http://www.siger.gob.mx/legismerc/LGSC.pdf (last visited Apr. 
21, 2018). 
89 LGSM art. 89, frac. I (Sociedad Anónima); id. arts. 59, 61 (Soceidad de Responsabilidad Limitada) 
(referring to “partners,” plural, and capping the number of partners at fifty); LGSC art. 2 (Sociedad 
Cooperativa) (referring to “persons,” plural). 
90 See infra Table 1. 
91 Esparza García, supra note 42. 
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with realistically only one true owner, it would be preferable to reform the law 
to reflect that there can be only one owner regardless of the business size. 
  
Notably, this point does not necessarily require reforming the SAS 
entity.  Alternatively, the Mexican legislature could develop a second 
unipersonal entity available to converting SAS entities, and could in other 
regards regulate this entity like a traditional business entity.  Nonetheless, 
further reform is desirable to ensure that SAS entities and their owners have a 
properly illuminated path to growth without unnecessary restriction. 
 
3. Allowing Juridical Shareholders and Ownership of 
Multiple SAS Entities Would Support Economic 
Efficiency 
  
Lastly, allowing for both wholly owned subsidiaries92 and for SAS 
owners to own more than one entity is economically beneficial because it 
reduces creditor-monitoring costs.  As the SAS law currently stands, an SAS 
cannot be used as a wholly owned subsidiary for any other entity type because 
it cannot have juridical persons as shareholders.93  However, under creditor-
monitoring theory, wholly owned subsidiaries are typically seen as beneficial 
to creditors rather than detrimental.  Credit-monitoring theory explains that 
when a company is able to form wholly owned subsidiaries to represent its 
specialized business interests, a creditor can better evaluate the specific 
business of the subsidiary.  Creditors include not only financial institutions 
such as banks, but also groups such as employees who receive a paycheck 
after they have worked, customers who pay before receiving goods or services, 
and suppliers who supply on credit.  Creditors assess businesses to determine 
the terms on which they will supply credit to a firm.  That is, they assess the 
probability that the business might fail and its ability to pay its creditors if it 
does.94  For example, imagine that a business had only one entity, but from 
that entity, ran a restaurant, a cookbook shop, and a noodle factory.  
Alternatively, the business could have a holding company that holds three 
wholly owned subsidiaries:  one for the bookstore, one for the restaurant, and 
one for the noodle factory.  In the second scenario, it would be easier for 
                                                     
92 “Wholly owned subsidiary” refers to an entity that has as its sole shareholder another juridical entity. 
93 LGSM art. 260. 
94 Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 715, 720–21 (2013). 
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creditors to assess the individual businesses because they would only be faced 
with assessing the individual businesses rather than the entity as a whole.95 
 
As the SAS currently exists, it discourages this result.  An SAS could 
run multiple types of businesses from the same entity.  This is because SAS 
ownership is limited to only those who are not the majority owner in any other 
Mexican business entity96 as paired with the fact that the law does not limit 
the licit business objectives an SAS can have97—meaning its objective could 
be “any business purpose,” or the like.  This is a more difficult structure for 
creditors to assess than if the businesses were spread out through separate SAS 
entities, either in the form of many separate businesses owned by one 
shareholder or separate SAS entities owned by a holding company.  Both 
under the status quo and the imagined reform, these businesses could be 
limited to start-ups, if the Mexican legislature so desires. 
 
In the same vein, it would likewise be beneficial if other business entity 
types could hold SAS entities for two reasons:  first, allowing wholly owned 
subsidiaries reduces creditor-monitoring costs; and second, allowing juridical 
persons to own SAS shares fosters small-business funding.  Already-
established firms should likewise have access to SAS entity formation in order 
to reduce their monitoring costs.  Arguably, in the face of concern about 
overly large businesses bypassing notary, registration, and reporting processes 
by using an SAS,98 forming an SAS subsidiary is a happy medium.  That is 
because these businesses have already formed using the traditional, more 
burdensome procedures, and would only be adding another entity to their 
existing group.  These businesses would not be avoiding the process 
altogether, but rather streamlining their growth down the road. 
 
Additionally, allowing for juridical-person shareholders of SAS entities 
would help encourage economic growth because this is a common start-up 
investment method.  The standard way that venture capital firms and angel 
investors (together, “VCs”) operate is by buying a portion of the equity of a 
start-up that they assess as having potential and then later selling the shares 
when the company becomes profitable or goes public.99  They do this because 
start-ups are inherently risky, and there are generally restrictions on charging 
                                                     
95 For a similar explanation, see id. at 721. 
96 LGSM art. 260. 
97 Id. arts. 3, 264. 
98 See generally Discusión del Dictamen, supra note 33 (discussing these concerns throughout the 
legislative discussion). 
99 See J. Paul Stouse, Venture Capital Financing, 49 LA. B. J. 308, 308–09 (2002). 
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the kinds of interest that would be necessary to balance the cost and risk of 
start-up investment through other types of lending.  However, in the case of 
the SAS, the entities are not allowed to have juridical-person shareholders.  
Therefore, unless the VCs find a pertinent alternate financing method, they 
will not want to invest in start-ups that are formed as an SAS.  This means 
that entrepreneurs hoping for early funding may be forced into the 
burdensome company registration schemes that the SAS law was intended to 
bypass.  The SAS law should, therefore, be reformed to allow SAS entities to 
take funding from firms like VCs.  An alternative to a total reform allowing 
any juridical person to hold shares in an SAS would be to allow only registered 
financial firms or VCs to do so for investment purposes. 
 
In order to better reflect its legislative intent as explained above, the 
Mexican legislature should consider reforming the SAS law to remove the 
income cap, allow the SAS to be used as a wholly owned subsidiary, allow 
SAS controlling shareholders to own more than one entity, and allow for 
juridical-person SAS shareholders.  The income cap should be lifted or 
otherwise reformed because it serves as a barrier to growth for companies, 
only shifts the burdens of registration down the road, does not reflect the 
reality of when businesses are most likely to fail, and, in some circumstances, 
creates perverse incentives to find sham partners or limit or misrepresent 
growth as to avoid the necessity of entity conversion.  The SAS should be 
usable as a wholly owned subsidiary and SAS controlling shareholders should 
be able to hold more than one SAS because this allows for specialized entities 
that in turn reduce creditor-monitoring costs—a more economically efficient 
result.  Finally, the SAS should be able to have juridical-person shareholders 
because this enhances start-up ability to receive initial funding from outside 
sources, which is important for business growth.  The above ideas for lifting 
restrictions can be seen as a jumping-off point for how the entity could be 
reformed to increase economic benefit and efficiency. 
 
B. Rule of Law Analysis:  The Mexican SAS Reform Lacks Clarity 
and May Be Difficult to Comply With 
  
There is a rule of law argument for reforming the Mexican SAS law 
because the transitory nature of the entity creates the risk of unpredictability 
for a standard user.  In other words, as the SAS law currently exists, its 
function may not meet its intention.  Reform could foster simpler compliance 
and therefore bolster the rule of law in this context.  Two facets of rule of law 
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deficit—reasonable clarity and capability of compliance—demonstrate this 
point. 
 
While the rule of law is defined often but rarely consistently, one of the 
most well-respected conceptualizations is from Lon Fuller.100  Fuller defines 
the rule of law as consisting of eight elements:  the law must be 1) generally 
applicable rather than decided on an ad hoc basis; 2) publicly available or 
otherwise made available to affected parties; 3) prospective rather than 
retroactive; 4) reasonably understandable and clear; 5) not internally 
contradictory; 6) capable of being complied with—not requiring conduct 
beyond the powers of the affected party; 7) reasonably stable so that the 
subject can orient its actions in accordance with the law; and 8) possess 
congruence between the rules as announced and their administration.101 
  
Here, at first glance, it appears that the Mexican SAS law fulfills the 
rule of law factors:  1) it applies equally to everyone who wishes to constitute 
a Mexican SAS;102 2) its text is readily available both as part of the LGSM 
online103 and on government web pages explaining the new entity type;104 3) 
entity founders must explicitly choose the SAS entity and there is no 
prescribed manner for it to be retroactively applied against their will;105 4) the 
text of the law is not overly complicated106 and is broken down in various 
government publications; 5) it appears theoretically possible to comply with 
                                                     
100 It seems telling of his influence on legal philosophy that a WestLaw search for “Lon /2 Fuller [as to 
account for instances where his middle initial is included] & ‘rule of law’” returns 3016 law review and 
journal article results. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 123 (2005) (citing 
Fuller’s definition of the rule of law and noting its importance); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule 
of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 784–85 (1989) (same); James W. Torke, What Is This Thing Called the Rule of 
Law?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2001) (same). 
101 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–39 (1964) (outlining these factors through his parable of 
King Rex); Brauch, supra note 100, at 123 (citing FULLER, supra, at 38–91). 
102 See generally LGSM cap. XIV (outlining the SAS law without providing exceptions requiring ad 
hoc application). 
103 See id. 
104 See Tu Empresa, GOB.MX, https://www.gob.mx/tuempresa (providing information about what the 
SAS entity is and how to form one); 6 Diferencias Entre la S.A.S. y la S.A., INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE 
EMPRENDEDOR: BLOG DE EMPRENDEDOR (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.inadem.gob.mx/6-diferencias-entre-
la-s-a-s-y-la-s-a/ (explaining the differences between the SAS and a traditional Soceidad Anónima). 
105 See generally LGSM. Notably, there is no provision allowing for another entity type to 
automatically transform into an SAS if it drops to one shareholder and otherwise meets the requirements, 
although the law does outline such a drop in the number of shareholders as a reason for automatic dissolution 
of an entity. See id. art. 229, frac. IV. 
106 See generally id. cap. XIV. The author, whose first language is not Spanish and who is not a lawyer 
in any Spanish-speaking jurisdiction, found it easy to follow. See also Tu Empresa, supra note 104; 6 
Diferencias Entre la S.A.S. y la S.A., supra note 104. 
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all of the provisions of the law at the same time;107 6) with the exception of 
unlikely events, such as possible government error in running the registration 
system,108 the affected founder can control his or her own compliance with the 
law; 7) although reasonably new, the law has not been amended since its 
promulgation; 109  and 8) there is no reason to believe there is a lack of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their administration, as the 
government registration portal outlines the same applicable rules as the law.110 
  
However, an issue arises when considering that, per its description of 
legislative intent, the law is targeted at unsophisticated business founders, 
such as youths, new entrepreneurs, and the informal economy.111  The text of 
the law helps ensure this intent by stating that shareholders of an SAS may 
not be controlling shareholders in any other Mexican business entity, 112 
therefore limiting the pool of SAS shareholders to those who are unlikely to 
be particularly experienced in managing a business entity.  The provision of 
the law that is problematic under the rule of law theory in this context is the 
capping of annual total income of the SAS business at $5 million MXN 
(approximately $250,000 USD).  After the threshold point, the entity must 
transform into another entity, which would require a second shareholder and 
more difficult registration processes involving a public notary,113 or instantly 
lose its limited liability protection.114  Arguably, this violates the rule of law 
norms both of reasonable clarity—when taking into account who must 
understand this legal provision—and of capability of being complied with—
when taking into account how transformation so as to maintain limited 
liability is to occur. 
 
As noted above, the law is targeted at unsophisticated businesspeople.  
Therefore, it is not outside the realm of possibility that a sole SAS shareholder 
may not understand the difference between income and profits and, as such, 
be completely unaware that they have lost limited liability protection due to 
high total annual income but low annual profits.  As noted above, the text of 
the law fails to specify whether this cap is gross income, net income, income 
                                                     
107 See generally LGSM cap. XIV. 
108 See id. art. 263 (outlining the registration system, including points of government involvement). 
109 See id. cap. XIV (amendments). 
110 See Tu Empresa, supra note 104; cf. LGSM cap. XIV. 
111 Exposición de Motivos, supra note 25, at 1. 
112 LGSM art. 260. 
113 See, e.g., LGSM cap. V (outlining how to form a Sociedad Anónima in Mexico, which requires at 
least two shareholders and the involvement of a public notary). 
114 See id. art. 260 (capping SAS annual total income at $5 million MXN). 
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before taxes, or income after taxes.115  This lack of specificity could easily 
create a very confusing situation for a new business owner who does not 
understand how to account for the income cap.  The formation provisions for 
the SAS entity make this type of error even more likely to occur.  While it is 
generally beneficial that the SAS can be registered online by the 
shareholder(s), the lack of mandatory involvement of any sort of legal 
professional 116  increases the likelihood that the shareholder(s) will be 
unaware of or fail to understand the income cap risk. 
 
Additionally, the instantaneity of losing limited liability protection if 
the SAS does not transform into another entity could be considered 
compliance-challenged when taking into account that registration of other 
entities often takes upwards of three weeks and can cost around $30,000 MXN 
(approximately $1500 USD),117 a large sum in a country where the average 
monthly income is approximately $750 USD.118  The cost issue is exacerbated 
when considering that the need to transform or lose liability protection is 
based on income, not profits,119 so a business could technically reach the $5 
million MXN limit without seeing sufficient profits to finance the 
transformation.  Likewise, the time it takes to constitute a different entity type 
could be an issue if rapid or sudden, perhaps unforeseen, income brings the 
business to the annual threshold and it does not have time to find another 
shareholder and transform its entity structure. 
 
Therefore, the provision in the law governing the Mexican SAS 
providing for a $5 million MXN income cap wherein after the entity 
automatically and instantly loses its limited liability protection may signal a 
rule of law deficit.  This is for two reasons:  the type of business owners that 
the law targets are particularly ill-equipped to clearly understand this rule, and 
due to the instant nature of the loss of limited liability coverage, entity 
conversion as a solution may not be realistically possible in all situations. 
 
                                                     
115 Id. 
116 See id. art. 263, frac. VI (noting that the use of a public notary is optional). 
117 See, e.g., 6 Diferencias Entre la S.A.S. y la S.A., supra note 104 (noting a three-week incorporation 
time for Sociedades Anónimas and quoting the price at around $30,000 MXN); Ease of Doing Business in 
Mexico, supra note 29 (quoting an incorporation time for a Sociedad Anónima in Mexico City of 8.5 days, 
but also noting that the costs of incorporation would be about 18.2% of the standard income per capita). 
118 Ease of Doing Business in Mexico, supra note 29 (noting that the gross national income per capita 
is $9040 MXN, which divided by twelve produces a monthly income). 
119 LGSM art. 260. 
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C. Comparative Analysis:  The Mexican SAS Is Uniquely Restrictive 
When Compared to Similarly Situated Countries 
  
The restrictive nature of the Mexican SAS framework is illustrated by 
comparing the Mexican unipersonal limited liability entity law to those of 
other similarly situated countries.  When considered alongside a set of Latin 
American counterparts, it is apparent that many of the restrictions critiqued 
above are unique to Mexico.  Appendix B provides a table comparing the 
unipersonal limited liability entities of the countries discussed within on a 
variety of factors. 
 
Latin America is a region with a unique legal framework.  A 
fundamental uniting characteristic of the corporate legal structure norms of 
most of Latin America, including Mexico, is that these norms are code-
based. 120   The commercial codes of Latin America are founded on the 
continental European civil law tradition, particularly the French Napoleonic 
Code. 121   While the codes of different Latin American countries have 
developed separately, they share the same roots.  In recognition of the unique 
legal heritage of Latin America, this section compares the Mexican SAS entity 
to the available unipersonal limited liability entities of five other similarly 
situated Latin American countries:  Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, 
and Uruguay.122  These countries were selected because, like Mexico, they all 
have civil legal systems and they are all former Spanish colonies, thus 
enhancing their shared legal heritage.123  Additionally, within the universe of 
countries satisfying these general characteristics, as of the end of 2017, they 
are the five largest economies based on GDP per capita, with Mexico coming 
in sixth.124  These countries serve as examples of implementation (or lack of 
                                                     
120 Francisco Reyes Villamizar, Sociedad por Acciones Simplificadas: Una Alternativa Útil para los 
Empresarios Latinoamericanos, 59 THĒMIS REVISTA DE DERECHO 73, 75–76 (2011) (Peru), 
http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/themis/article/view/9096/9507. 
121 Id. at 80. 
122 Notably, Colombia also offers an SAS entity. However, it is not discussed in this comment as to 
instead highlight the discrepancies that exist between the similarly situated Latin American countries selected, 
including those that have not instituted a SAS-type entity. 
123 See Courtney Jung et al., Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 1043, 1090 tbl.A1 (2014) (listing these countries under “Pure Civil Law”); Daniel Oto-Peralías & Diego 
Romero-Ávila, The Distribution of Legal Traditions Around the World: A Contribution to the Legal-Origins 
Theory, 57 J.L. & ECON. 561, 573 tbl.A2 (2014) (listing these countries as former Spanish colonies). 
124 See IMF DataMapper: GDP per Capita, Current Prices, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2018) (listing Uruguay first at $17,250 USD, Panama second at $14,410 USD, Chile third at $14,310 
USD, Argentina fourth at $14,060 USD, Costa Rica fifth at $11,860 USD, and Mexico sixth at $9250 USD). 
All but Mexico have a GDP per capita above the Central and South America regional averages of $5380 
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implementation) of unipersonal limited liability entities in economically 
successful countries with a legal heritage similar to that of Mexico. 
 
The restrictive nature of the Mexican SAS entity is particularly 
apparent when compared with its peers.  The following entities will be 
considered:  from Argentina, the Sociedad Anónima Unipersonal, or 
Unipersonal Corporation (“Argentine SAU”) and the Argentine SAS; from 
Chile, the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada, or Individual 
Limited Liability Company (“Chilean EIRL”) and the Chilean SpA; from 
Costa Rica, the Sociedad Anónima, or Corporation (“Costa Rican SA”) and 
the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada, or Individual Limited 
Liability Company (“Costa Rican EIRL”); and, from Panama the Sociedad 
Anónima, or Corporation (“Panamanian SA”).  While Uruguay is included 
and considered, it has no unipersonal entity.  All SAS and SpA entities are 
collectively referred to in this Comment as “SAS-type” entities. 
 
Notably, the only country in this comparison that does not have a 
unipersonal limited liability entity is Uruguay,125 and the only country that 
does have a unipersonal limited liability entity but does not allow for 
incorporation by a single owner is Panama.126  It is therefore the norm rather 
than the exception for Mexico’s Latin American peers, such as Argentina, 
Chile, and Costa Rica, to allow for a unipersonal limited liability entity that 
can be incorporated by the sole owner. 
 
                                                     
USD and $9300 USD, respectively. Id. As such, these countries can be considered to be relatively 
economically successful in their regions. 
125 See infra Table 1. 
126 However, it is notable that in practice, Panamanian Sociedad Anónimas are often incorporated by 
two “subscribers” who are attorneys at the firm hired by the client, and then the entity is immediately 
transferred in full to the sole owner. Therefore, this two-shareholder-incorporation minimum can be seen as 
more theoretical that actual. See Law No. 32, Sobre Sociedades Anónimas art. 1, Febrero 26, 1927, [5067] 
GACETA OFICIAL (Panama), https://panama.eregulations.org/media/Ley%2032%20de%201927%20-%20 
Sociedades.pdf [hereinafter Law No. 32 Panama], art. 1; see also Sociedades Anónimas: Preguntas 
Frecuentes, DELVALLE & DELVALLE L. FIRM, https://www.delvallepanama.com/es/Sociedades-Anonimas/ 
preguntas-frecuentes-2.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (stating that common practice is for two lawyers 
representing the client to visit the notary and serve as the two initial shareholders, and then immediately 
transfer all shares to the true owner); Sociedades Anonimas en Panama, BFC LAWYERS, 
http://www.offshorepanamaniancorporations.com/es/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (indicating that it is 
common practice for firm lawyers to act as the initial subscribers and then, after formation and registration, 
renounce their subscriber rights and transfer all shares to the client); Gilberto Boutin, Panamanian Offshore 
Company Law and Conflicting Laws, 2 INT’L BUS. L.J. 171, 177 (2007) (“Truth to tell, it is inaccurate to 
describe or treat simple subscribers as shareholders in the offshore company, because in most cases the 
subscribers are only employees of the law firm responsible for creating the company registered.”). 
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Similarly notable is the timeline for adoption of these entities in the 
sample group.  Costa Rica embraced single owner limited liability in 1961,127 
and was followed by Panama shortly thereafter in 1966.128  However, other 
countries did not follow suit for more than four decades, as Chile did not adopt 
a unipersonal limited liability entity until 2003,129 and Argentina did not do 
so until 2014.130  With its 2016 adoption,131 Mexico can be seen as part of this 
later adoption wave of limited liability entities.  This two-wave timeline also 
shows a move towards easily accessible online incorporation procedures, as 
all of the second wave countries have implemented some sort of online 
incorporation procedure, while the countries that embraced unipersonal 
limited liability in the 1960s still require some sort of in-person process.132 
 
All the entities can be viewed as functionally similar in terms of 
limiting liability, as liability is limited to either the capital of the shareholder 
or promised capital of the shareholder.133  Perhaps the only exception that can 
be seen as less limited is the Chilean EIRL, which only limits liability of the 
owner for permissible commercial activities within the single declared 
purpose of the entity.134  However, despite more severe language, functionally 
this is likely fairly equivalent to the others, as it simply limits liability to 
proper activities of the business.  Accordingly, all the entities appear to be true 
limited liability entities per the terms of their authorizing statutes. 
 
                                                     
127 See infra Table 1. 
128 However, Panama has since retired the unipersonal limited liability entity that it enacted at that time, 
the Empresa Individual de Responsabilidad Limitada (“EIRL”). See infra Table 1. Notably, Panama first 
directly allowed for a unipersonal limited liability entity in 1966 with the creation of the EIRL, or Individual 
Limited Liability Company. See Law No. 24, Por la Cual Se Regulan las Empresas de Responsabilidad 
Limitada, Febrero 1, 1966, [15588] GACETA OFICIAL, https://docs.panama.justia.com/ 
federales/leyes/24-de-1966-mar-31-1966.pdf [hereinafter Law No. 24 Panama]. However, this law was 
derogated in 2009, and the new law no longer recognizes the EIRL, and states that Panamanian LLC-
equivalents must dissolve if they have less than two shareholders for more than sixty business days. See Law 
No. 4, Que Regula las Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada art. 44(8), Enero 9, 2009, [26202-A] GACETA 
OFICIAL, https://docs.panama.justia.com/federales/leyes/4-de-2009-jan-15-2009.pdf. 
129 See infra Table 1. 
130 See infra Table 1. 
131 See infra Table 1. 
132 See infra Table 1. It is notable that all of the countries with online procedures advertise incorporation 
times for their unipersonal limited liability entities of a day or less, and those involving some in-person aspect 
likewise advertise times ranging from one to six days, while the World Bank Doing Business Data provides 
times of six days (Panama) to twenty-four days (Argentina). See infra Table 1. It would be interesting to 
monitor these World Bank published times and see if they decrease as online process becomes more standard 
in Latin America. 
133 See infra Table 1. 
134 See infra Table 1. 
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Two areas where Mexico bests many of its peers are the costs of 
formation and initial capitalization.  Formation of a Mexican SAS is free.135  
The only other country that offers no cost to form a unipersonal limited 
liability entity is Chile. 136   Costs in the other countries range from 
approximately $80 USD (Argentina)137 to $990 USD (Panama).138  Likewise, 
the Mexican SAS has no minimum capital requirement.139  Chile and Costa 
Rica also offer no minimum capital requirements,140 but Costa Rica does not 
offer free formation. 141   Therefore, the formation pricing models and 
capitalization requirements used by Mexico and Costa Rica are the best in 
terms of creating truly accessible entity forms by lowering the financial 
barriers to entry.142 
 
However, three areas where Mexico is comparatively, and arguably 
overly, restrictive are the annual income cap of $5 million MXN, the 
limitation of shareholders to natural persons only, and the limitation of 
shareholders to only those who are not controlling shareholders in any other 
Mexican entity.  These measures are problematic either because they are not 
theoretically sound, not in line with the purpose of the law, or both.143  When 
viewed comparatively, it becomes apparent that these measures are also 
uniquely problematic to Mexico, as none of its peers have adopted similar 
provisions.144  These nonconformities are especially notable when looking to 
Argentina and Chile, as their SAS-type entities are likewise targeted to start-
up businesses,145 but do not impose these same hurdles. 
                                                     
135 See infra Table 1. 
136 See infra Table 1. 
137 See infra Table 1. 
138 See infra Table 1. 
139 See infra Table 1. 
140 As the Panama $10,000 USD minimum capitalization requirement is an “on paper” capital 
requirement and does not actually have to be paid at the time of incorporation, it could be argued that it 
likewise has no minimum capital requirement for incorporation. However, given that Panama offers by far 
the highest cost of incorporation, at around $990 USD, it would be hard to argue that incorporation in Panama 
is without financial barriers to entry. Id. 
141 See infra Table 1. 
142 It is interesting that, of the countries considered, Mexico and Costa Rica have the lowest gross 
domestic incomes per capita, at approximately $9040 and $10,840, respectively. See infra Table 1. This may 
have influenced the importance of eliminating financial barriers to entry for start-up businesses in these 
countries. 
143 See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
144 See infra Table 1. 
145 See Crear una Empresa, CHILE ATIENDE (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/ 
fichas/ver/22718 (describing the SpA as recommended for entrepreneurs seeking investors); Los 
Emprendedores Argentinos Ya Pueden Crear Su Empresa en un Día en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
MINISTERIO DE PRODUCCIÓN (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.produccion.gob.ar/2017/09/28/los-
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Mexico is the only country imposing an income cap on any unipersonal 
limited liability entity.146  Mexico’s income cap is therefore a singularly harsh 
attempt to limit the use of unipersonal limited liability entities.  Likewise, the 
limitation to natural persons only as shareholders of its only unipersonal 
limited liability entity is unique to Mexico.  While Chile and Costa Rica both 
limit use of their respective Chilean EIRL and Costa Rican EIRL entity forms 
to natural persons only147 and place other restrictions on them, such as having 
limited business objectives148 and the inability to own other businesses,149 
each of those countries also offers a different unipersonal limited liability 
entity that can have legal persons as shareholders.  In addition to the EIRL 
form, Chile offers the Chilean SpA, which can be incorporated by a single 
shareholder who can be a legal person,150 and Costa Rica offers the Costa 
Rican SA, which does require two shareholders—who can be either natural or 
legal persons—to incorporate, but thereafter can reduce to one shareholder.151  
This means that in both of those jurisdictions, there is an alternative available 
if a company would like to form a wholly owned subsidiary.  However, in 
Mexico there is not. 
 
The Argentine solution to the perceived problem of chains of 
unipersonal limited liability entities is notable.  In Argentina, there are two 
options for unipersonal limited liability entities:  1) the Argentine SAU, which 
must first be formed as an Argentine Sociedad Anónima, or Corporation 
(“Argentine SA”), with a minimum of two shareholders and then later 
transformed to an Argentine SAU with only one shareholder;152 and 2) the 
Argentine SAS, which can be formed with only one shareholder who is a 
natural or legal person.153  However, another Argentine SAS cannot own an 
Argentine SAS.  In this way, Argentina provides options for companies who 
wish to incorporate a wholly owned subsidiary without allowing for stacking 
of the less stringent SAS entities as to produce a real or perceived 
overlimitation of liability through a corporate group.  The Chilean, Costa 
Rican, and Argentine models all provide alternatives to the currently 
restrictive Mexican model. 
                                                     
emprendedores-argentinos-ya-pueden-crear-su-empresa-en-un-dia-en-la-ciudad-de-buenos-aires-67469 
(touting the Argentine SAS as an entity for start-ups). 
146 See infra Table 1. 
147 See infra Table 1. 
148 See infra Table 1. 
149 See infra Table 1. 
150 See infra Table 1. 
151 See infra Table 1. 
152 See infra Table 1. 
153 See infra Table 1. 
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Finally, the Mexican SAS is the only entity of the group that limits 
shareholders to those who are not controlling shareholders in any other 
Mexican entity.154  There is no analog to this in another comparable country’s 
laws.  In contrast, in Chile, where the Chilean EIRL is restrictive in its own 
way, owners are permitted to have multiple Chilean EIRLs for different 
business objectives.155  In this way, the Mexican SAS functionally limits the 
amount of limited liability protection that one person can have while the 
unipersonal limited liability entities of similarly situated countries limit the 
liability of the business. 
  
In summary, the timing of the Mexican SAS fits in the second wave of 
unipersonal limited liability entity legislation among its Latin American peers, 
and its brand of limited liability is comparable with the entities of its peers.  
The areas where Mexico excels in meeting the goal of introducing an entity 
structure with limited financial barriers to entry are the provision of free, 
online formation procedures and the nonexistent minimum capital 
requirement.  However, the income cap and limitation of shareholders to only 
natural persons who are not controlling shareholders in another Mexican 
entity are comparatively restrictive and are ripe for reform to bring the 
Mexican entity in line with its counterparts. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  
This Comment has analyzed the Mexican SAS entity through multiple 
lenses and repeatedly come to the conclusion that as it currently exists, it is 
too restrictive.  However, what can be done to reform this entity structure in 
order to make it less restrictive? 
 
The main drive behind the implementation of the SAS entity in Mexico 
is the pursuit of economic growth through the facilitation of new business 
creation.  However, simply aiding new businesses to form but later throwing 
them into the complicated system that the SAS entity was intended to avoid 
is likely not the most effective way to meet this goal.  This is both because 
larger businesses can individually account for significantly more overall 
economic growth and because this structure can create perverse incentives for 
businesses not to grow, not to report their growth, or to find sham shareholders 
for conversion.  Additionally, subsidiaries, a function currently not allowed 
                                                     
154 See infra Table 1. 
155 See infra Table 1. 
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for SAS entities, facilitate economic growth through both reducing creditor-
monitoring costs and allowing for venture capital investment. 
 
Keeping these findings in mind, the SAS could be brought further in 
line with its legislative intent by doing away with the earnings cap and 
opening up to any type of shareholder.  Eliminating the earnings cap would 
be beneficial to the SAS entity because it would allow SAS entities to grow 
uninhibited without fear of losing their limited liability protection, and it 
would allow true single-owner entities to reflect their reality regardless of 
their size.  Opening SAS entities up to juridical-person shareholders would 
allow the SAS to serve as a simple, easy-to-form subsidiary for companies 
already in operation who have already gone through the full formation process 
with a public notary and shown their legitimacy.  It would also allow true 
start-up SAS entities to accept venture capital funding.  Venture capital 
funding would be advantageous as other, more traditional methods of funding 
that do not include the sale of equity may not be available at the beginning 
stages of a company. 
  
Further, the transitory nature of the Mexican SAS entity creates a risk 
of unpredictability for a standard user, particularly when considering that the 
law is targeted at unsophisticated users such as young people, entrepreneurs, 
and the informal economy.  This is because the ability to instantly lose limited 
liability protection if conversion to another business entity type is not 
achieved before reaching the $5 million MXN income cap may prove too 
difficult or complicated in some situations.  Three suggestions address this 
problem.  First, Mexico should consider eliminating its current restriction on 
SAS shareholders that prevents those who are the controlling shareholder in 
another Mexican entity from owning a SAS.  This would allow the 
inexperienced groups the SAS currently targets to partner with experienced 
businesspeople that could guide the new business owners in following the 
letter of the law.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, Mexico should 
consider removing the $5 million MXN income cap.  It appears that the 
income cap mainly serves to create an additional level of regulatory difficulty, 
and without this cap, the law would be simple to follow and administer for 
everyone involved.  Third, if Mexico prefers to maintain the income cap, it is 
important that further regulations be promulgated and accessibly published so 
as to specify for a new business owner what “total annual income” means.  
For example, such regulations and promulgations should directly specify 
whether the cap is intended to account for gross income, net income, before 
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taxes, or after taxes, and it might also include examples of financial statements 
to practically demonstrate to new business owners how to locate this amount. 
 
Finally, when compared to similarly situated Latin American countries 
with a unipersonal limited liability entity, Mexico stands alone in the types of 
restrictions it imposes.  It is certainly true that some countries, such as Panama 
and Costa Rica, have yet to introduce SAS-type entities.  However, these 
countries have long offered more traditional forms of unipersonal entities, and 
Mexican SAS restrictions are more properly compared to other SAS-type 
entities.  The laws of other countries in the same vein should illustrate to 
Mexico that perhaps such restrictions are unnecessary.  Therefore, for Mexico 
to better reflect the regional norm, it should consider eliminating the annual 
$5 million MXN income cap, allowing juridical persons to be shareholders in 
SAS entities, and eliminating the restriction on those who are controlling 
shareholders in another Mexican entity from being shareholders in an SAS. 
 
Comparison with other similarly situated Latin American countries also 
offers reform alternatives for Mexico.  For example, the Argentine SAS, 
which is likewise targeted to new businesses and entrepreneurs, is not subject 
to the same restrictions as the Mexican SAS.  Particularly, the Argentine SAS 
may have juridical shareholders.  However, an SAS cannot own another SAS.  
In this way, the Argentine law preserves the SAS as a start-up centric entity 
rather than allowing corporate families to form consisting of SAS entities.  If 
Mexico wishes to reform the Mexican SAS while preserving its start-up 
centric nature, it could look to the law reform efforts of similarly situated Latin 
American countries, like Argentina, for alternative legal structures. 
 
This is not to say that Mexican SAS reform going forward must be 
solely for the purpose of shedding regulation.  While many of the arguments 
against the Mexican SAS appear to be based in notary protectionism or 
general fears that are not truly unique to the SAS, there are some useful 
propositions for further regulation.  For example, it might be pertinent to 
institute an official dispute procedure so that people who believe their 
electronic signatures were used in the formation of an SAS without their 
permission can dispute any attributed ownership interest.  Further safeguards, 
such as automatically notifying the owner of an electronic signature if said 
signature is used to form an SAS or requiring SAS entities that reach a certain 
income level to begin setting aside a legal reserve, may also assuage fears 
about the new entity type over time. 
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Despite this call for further reform, the Mexican SAS is still a great 
achievement.  The Mexican SAS is a huge leap towards the modernization of 
Mexican company law; it is the first juridical entity in Mexico to allow for a 
single shareholder, and it brought with it a sophisticated online registration 
system.  Additionally, in regard to accessibility, such as through the cost of 
formation and any minimum capital requirements, Mexico has created a more 
accessible unipersonal entity than its peers.  The Mexican SAS can be seen 
overall as a successful experiment:  the SAS has demonstrated that Mexico is 
capable of running a framework for business incorporation that can be done 
quickly and online.  Now that this has been tested with the small group of 
business people interested in forming an SAS entity, Mexico should utilize 
the springboard it has already designed and begin expanding this new 
framework to a variety of entity types and other processes, such as registration 
of a company name.  Further reform to include a greater variety of businesses 
could foster economic growth at all levels. 
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Appendix A: Mexican SAS Law Reform Translation156 
Monday, March 14, 2016 
Reforming and Adding Various Provisions of the General Law of 
Commercial Companies 
Article 1.- … 
  I. to IV. … 
  V. Limited partnership with shares; 
  VI. Cooperative association; and 
  VII. Simplified joint stock company 
Any of the companies referred to in parts I to V and VII of this article 
can be incorporated as a variable capital company, observing then the 
dispositions of Chapter VII of this law.  
Article 2.- … 
… 
… 
… 
In the case of the simplified joint stock company, in order for it to be 
effective before third parties, it must be registered in the aforementioned 
register.  
… 
… 
Article 5.- … 
The simplified joint stock company will be formed through the process 
established in Chapter XIV of this Law.  
Article 20.- Except for the simplified joint stock company, every 
company shall separate five percent annually, as a minimum, of the net 
utilities to form the reserve fund until it is equivalent to a fifth of the share 
capital.  
Chapter XIV 
On the simplified joint stock company 
Article 260.- The simplified joint stock company is one which is 
constituted by one or more individuals that are only obligated to pay their 
contributions as represented in shares. In no case may individuals 
simultaneously be shareholders of another type of commercial company 
referred to in sections I to VII of article 1 of this Law, if their participation in 
these commercial companies allows them to control the company or its 
                                                     
156 For the full text of the reform to the LGSM taken to include the SAS, see Decreto por el que Se 
Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, DOF 14-03-
2016 (Mex.), formato PDF, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lgsm/LGSM_ref15_ 
14mar16.pdf. 
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administration, in the terms of article 2, section III of the Securities Market 
Law.  
The total annual income of a simplified joint stock company may not 
exceed $5 million MXN. In the event of exceeding this respective amount, the 
simplified joint stock company shall be transformed into another company 
regime contemplated in this Law, in the terms in which it is established in the 
rules indicated in article 263 of the same. The established amount in this 
paragraph shall update annually on the first of January of every year, 
considering the update factor corresponding to the period from the month of 
December in the penultimate year to the month of December of the year 
immediately preceding for which the update is made, as will be obtained in 
accordance with Article 17-A of the Fiscal Code of the Federation. The 
Secretary of Economy will publish the update factor in the Official Gazette of 
the Federation during the month of January of each year.  
In the event that the shareholders do not carry out the transformation of 
the company referred to in the previous paragraph, they will have vicarious, 
joint and unlimited liability to third parties, without prejudice to any other 
liability that may have been incurred.  
Article 261.- The name will be formed freely, but different from that 
of any other company and always followed by the words “Sociedad por 
Acciones Simplificada” [Simplified Joint Stock Company] or its abbreviation 
“S.A.S.”.  
Article 262.- To proceed with the formation of a simplified joint stock 
company, only the following will be required: 
I. That there is one or more shareholders; 
II. That the shareholder or shareholders externalize their consent 
to form a simplified joint stock company under the bylaws 
that the Secretary of Economy will make available through 
the electronic formation system;  
III. That any of the shareholders have authorization issued by the 
Secretary of Economy for the use of the name; and 
IV. That all shareholders have a current advanced electronic 
signature certificate as recognized in the general rules issued 
by the Secretary of Economy in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 263 of this Law.  
 
In no case shall the public deed requirement, notary public policy or 
any other additional formality be required for the constitution of the simplified 
joint stock company. 
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 Article 263.- For purposes of the provisions of article 262 of this Law, 
the electronic formation system will be in the charge of the Secretary of 
Economy and will be carried out by digital means through the computer 
program established for that purpose, whose functioning and operation will 
be governed by the general rules issued by the same Secretary.  
 The formation procedure will be carried out in accordance with the 
following basis: 
I. A folio will be opened for each formation; 
II. The shareholder(s) will select bylaw clauses that the 
Secretary of Economy makes available through the system; 
III. The articles of organization for the simplified joint stock 
company will be generated electronically signed by all the 
shareholders, using the current electronic signature certificate 
referred to in section IV of article 262 of this Law, which will 
be delivered digitally; 
IV. The Secretary of Economy will verify that the articles of 
organization of the company comply with the provisions of 
article 264 of this Law, and if appropriate, send them 
electronically for registration in the Public Registry of 
Commerce; 
V. The system will digitally generate the registration slip for the 
simplified joint stock company in the Public Registry of 
Commerce; 
VI. The use of public notaries is optional; 
VII. The existence of the simplified joint stock company will be 
proved by the articles of organization of the company and the 
registration ticket in the Public Registry of Commerce;  
VIII. The shareholders requesting the formation of a simplified 
joint stock company will be responsible for the existence and 
veracity of the information provided in the system. 
Otherwise, they will be liable for any damages that may arise, 
without prejudice to the administrative or criminal penalties 
that may apply; and 
IX. Other regulations as established in the rules of the electronic 
formation system. 
Article 264.- The bylaws referred to in the previous article should only 
contain the following requirements: 
I. Company name; 
II. Name of the shareholders; 
III. Address of the shareholders; 
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IV. Federal Taxpayer Registry numbers of the shareholders; 
V. E-mail address for each of the shareholders; 
VI. Domicile of the company; 
VII. Duration of the company; 
VIII. The form and terms in which the shareholders are obligated 
to subscribe and pay their shares; 
IX. The number, nominal value and nature of the shares in which 
the capital stock in divided; 
X. The number of votes that each of the shareholders will have 
by virtue of their shares; 
XI. The purpose of the company; 
XII. The form of administration of the company. 
 
The shareholder or shareholders will have vicarious and joint liability, 
as appropriate, with the company for the commission of conduct sanctioned 
as criminal. 
 The contracts concluded between the sole shareholder and the company 
must be registered by the company in the electronic system established by the 
Secretary of Economy in accordance with the provisions of article 50 Bis of 
the Commercial Code. 
 Article 265.- All of the shares indicated in section IX of article 264 
must be paid within the term of one year from the date on which the company 
is registered in the Public Registry of Commerce.  
 When the total share capital has been subscribed and paid, the company 
must publish a notice in the electronic system established by the Secretary of 
Economy in terms of the provisions of article 50 Bis of the Commercial Code. 
 Article 266.- The Shareholders Assembly is the supreme body of the 
simplified joint stock company and is made up of all the shareholders. 
 The resolutions of the Shareholders Assembly shall be made by 
majority vote and it may be agreed that the meetings are held in person or by 
electronic means if an information system is established in terms of the 
provisions of article 89 of the Commercial Code. In any case, a record book 
of resolutions must be kept.  
 When the simplified joint stock company is composed of a single 
shareholder, it will be the supreme body of the company.  
 Article 267.- The representation of the simplified joint stock company 
will be in the charge of an administrator, a function that a shareholder will 
perform.  
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 When the simplified joint stock company is composed of a single 
shareholder, it will exercise the powers of representation and will have the 
position of administrator.  
 It is understood that the administrator, by its sole designation, may 
conclude or execute all the acts and contracts included under the company 
purpose or that are directly related to the existence and operation of the 
company.  
 Article 268.- The decision-making of the Shareholders Assembly will 
be governed only according to the following rules: 
I. All of the shareholders will have the right to participate in the 
decisions of the company; 
II. The shareholders will have voice and vote, the shares will be 
of equal value and confer the same rights; 
III. Any shareholder may submit matters to the Assembly for 
consideration, to be included in the agenda, as long as (s)he 
asks the administrator in writing or by electronic means, if an 
information system is agreed to in accordance with the 
provisions of article 89 of the Commercial Code;  
IV. The administrator will send to all shareholders the matter 
subject to voting in writing or by any electronic means if an 
information system is agreed to in accordance with the 
provisions of article 89 of the Commercial Code, noting the 
date to cast the respective vote; 
V. The shareholders will cast their vote on the issues in writing 
or by electronic means if an information system is agreed to 
in accordance with the provisions of article 89 of the 
Commercial Code, either in person or outside the meeting;  
 
The company’s administrator will convene the Shareholders Assembly 
by publication of a notice in the electronic system established by the Secretary 
of Economy a minimum of five business days in advance.  
 The notice will include the agenda with the matters that will be 
submitted to the Assembly for consideration, as well as the corresponding 
documents.  
 If the administrator refuses to call the meeting, or does not do so within 
a term of fifteen days following receipt of a shareholder request, the meeting 
may be called by the judicial authority of the company’s domicile, at the 
request of any shareholder. 
 Once the procedure established in this article has been exhausted, the 
resolutions of the Shareholders Assembly are considered valid and will be 
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binding on all shareholders if the vote was cast by a majority of the 
shareholders, unless the right to object provided for in this Law is exercised. 
 Article 269.- Modifications to the bylaws will be decided by majority 
vote.  
At any time, shareholders may agree on forms of organization and 
administration different from the one contemplated in this Chapter; provided 
that the shareholders conclude the transformation of the simplified joint stock 
company to any other type of commercial company before a notary public, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
 Article 270.- Unless otherwise agreed, the alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms provided for in the Commercial Code shall be favored 
to settle disputes that arise between shareholders, as well as disputes with third 
parties. 
 Article 271.- Unless otherwise agreed, the profits will be distributed in 
proportion to the shares of each shareholder. 
 Article 272.- The administrator will publish in the electronic system of 
the Secretary of Economy the annual report on the financial situation of the 
company in accordance with the rules issued by the Secretary of Economy in 
accordance with the provisions of article 263 of this Law. 
 Failure to present the financial situation for two consecutive years will 
result in the dissolution of the company, without prejudice to the liabilities 
incurred by the shareholders individually. For purposes of the provisions of 
this paragraph, the Secretary of Economy will issue the corresponding 
declaration of non-compliance in accordance with the procedure established 
in the rules mentioned in the preceding paragraph.  
 Article 273.- So far as they do not contradict this Chapter, the 
provisions of this Law governing the corporation as well as those relating to 
the merger, transformation, spin-off, dissolution and liquidation of companies 
are applicable to the simplified joint stock company.  
 In the case of the simplified joint stock company that is composed of a 
single shareholder, all of the provisions that refer to “shareholders” shall be 
deemed applicable with respect to the single shareholder. Also, those 
provisions that refer to “articles of organization” will be understood as 
referring to the “constituent instrument.”     
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Appendix B: Table 1—Comparing Available Limited Liability Unipersonal 
Entities in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay 
 Mexico Argentina Chile Costa Rica Panama Uruguay 
Name of 
available 
unipersonal 
limited 
liability 
entity 
Sociedad por 
Acciones 
Simplificada 
(SAS)157 
Sociedad 
Anónima 
Unipersonal 
(SAU) 
Sociedad por 
Acciones 
Simplificada 
(SAS) 
Empresa 
Individual de 
Responsa-
bilidad 
Limitada 
(EIRL) 
Sociedad por 
Acciones 
(SpA) 
Sociedad 
Anónima 
(SA) 
Empresa 
Individual de 
Responsa-
bilidad 
Limitada 
(EIRL) 
Sociedad 
Anónima 
(SA) 
No uni-
personal 
limited 
liability 
entity 
currently 
available
158 
Translation 
of name 
Simplified 
Stock 
Corporation 
Unipersonal 
Corporation 
Simplified 
Stock 
Corporation 
Individual 
Limited 
Liability 
Company 
Stock 
Corporation 
Corporation 
Individual 
Limited 
Liability 
Company 
Corporation - 
Law 
governing 
entity 
Ley General 
de 
Sociedades 
Mercantiles, 
Capítulo 
XIV159  
Ley General 
de 
Sociedades, 
Arts. 1, 11, 
94 bis., 164, 
186, 187, 
299160 
Ley 
27.349/2017 
de Apoyo al 
Capital 
Empren-
dedor161 
Ley 19.857 
Autoriza el 
Estableci-
miento de 
Empresas 
Individuales 
de Responsa-
bilidad 
Limitada162 
Código de 
Comercio, § 
8163 
Código de 
Comercio, 
Capítulo 
VII164 
Código de 
Comercio, 
Capítulo II165 
Ley 32 de 
1927 Sobre 
Sociedades 
Anónimas166 
Ley 
16.060 de 
Socieda-
des 
Comercia-
les167 
Translation 
of law name 
General Law 
on 
Mercantile 
Companies, 
Chapter XIV 
General 
Company 
Law, Arts. 1, 
11, 94 bis., 
164, 186, 
187, 299 
Law 
27.349/2017 
for Support 
of Entrepre-
neurial 
Capital 
Law 19.857 
Authorizing 
the 
Establishment 
of Individual 
Limited 
Liability 
Companies 
Commercial 
Code, § 8 
Commercial 
Code, 
Chapter VII 
Commercial 
Code, 
Chapter II 
Law 32 of 
1927 About 
Corporations 
Commer-
cial 
Compan-
ies Law 
16.060  
Year enacted 
as 
unipersonal 
limited 
liability 
entity 
2016168 2014169 2017170 2003171 2007172 1961173 
Unclear174 
 
(EIRL in 
1966)175 
- 
Minimum 
number of 
share-
holders, etc. 
required at 
formation 
One 
shareholder
176 
 
Two 
shareholders
177 
One 
shareholder
178 
One owner179 
One 
shareholder
180 
 
Two 
shareholders
181 
One owner182 
 
 
Two 
shareholders
183 
- 
Natural vs. 
legal 
persons? 
Natural 
persons 
only184 
Both185 Both186 
Natural 
persons 
only187 
Both188 Both189 
Natural 
persons 
only190 
Both191 - 
How is 
liability 
limited? 
Limited to 
the amount 
of capital per 
shareholder
192 
Limited to 
the value of 
the shares 
subscribed 
per 
shareholder
193 
Limited to 
the value of 
stock 
subscribed or 
acquired, 
including up 
to the amount 
of any 
promised 
contributions 
when dealing 
with third 
parties194 
Limited to the 
committed 
contribution 
payments of 
the owner for 
EIRL 
permissible 
commercial 
activities195  
Limited to 
amount of 
capital per 
shareholder
196 
Limited to 
amount of 
capital per 
shareholder
197 
Limited to 
amount of 
capital (as 
there is only 
one 
owner)198 
Limited up to 
the amount 
the 
shareholder 
owes for its 
shares199 
- 
Online 
registration? 
Yes200 No201 Yes202 Yes203 Yes204 Partial205 No206 - 
Registration 
time 
advertised? 
One day207 No208 
Less one day 
(instant)209 
One day210 One to five days211 
One to six 
days212 
- 
General time 
to 
8.5 days214 24 days215 5.5 days216 22.5 days217 6 days218 6.5 days219 
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incorporate 
a business 
(World Bank 
Data)213 
Minimum 
share 
capital? 
No220 
$100,000 
ARS 221 
(approx. 
$5,300 
USD)222 
Two times 
the current 
minimum 
wage223 
 
Currently 
$17,720 
ARS 224 
(approx. 
$950 
USD)225 
No226 No227 No228 No229 
$10,000 
USD (on 
paper)230 
- 
Cost of 
formation? 
No cost231 
$1,500 
ARS 232 
(approx. $80 
USD)233 
$4,430 
ARS 234 
(approx. 
$235 
USD)235 
No cost236 No cost237 
₡236,916.08 CRC238 (approx. 
$415 USD)239  
Approx. 
$990 USD240 
- 
Maximum 
income? 
$5 million 
MXN per 
year to be 
adjusted 
yearly by 
regulation 241 
(approx. 
$250,000 
USD)242 
No243 No244 No245 No246 No247 No248 No249 - 
Gross 
Domestic 
Income Per 
Capita 
(World Bank 
Data)250 
$9,040 
USD251 
 
$753 
USD/month 
$11,960 USD252 
 
$967 USD/month 
$13,530 USD253 
 
$1,128 USD/month 
$10,840 USD254 
 
$903 USD/month 
$12,140 
USD255 
 
$1,012 
USD/month 
$15,230 
USD256 
 
$1,269 
USD/ 
month 
Other 
notable 
restrictions 
Share-
holders 
cannot be 
controlling 
share-
holders in 
any other 
Mexican 
commercial 
legal 
entity257  
A SAU must 
incorporate 
as a Sociedad 
Anónima and 
may later 
transform 
into a SAU258 
24 hour 
online 
registration 
is currently 
only 
available for 
residents of 
Buenos 
Aires, but 
there are 
plans to 
expand the 
program259 
EIRL may be 
used for any 
civil or 
commercial 
operations 
“except those 
reserved by 
the law to 
corporations,”
260 and it may 
only have one 
objective261 
- - 
EIRLs may 
not 
incorporate 
or acquire 
other 
companies262 
 
Owners may 
only 
withdraw 
profits from 
an EIRL after 
year end 
inventories 
and balances 
have been 
completed 
and it is 
shown that 
the business 
has realized 
liquid 
profits263 
The two 
initial 
subscribers 
must be 
natural 
persons264 
- 
 
784                              WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 3 
 
 
  
 
157 LGSM art. 260. 
158 See Law No. 16.060, Ley de Sociedades Comerciales art. 24, Noviembre 1, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Uru.), https://parlamento.gub.uy/documentosyleyes/leyes/ley/16060 [hereinafter LSC Uruguay] (stating that a 
commercial company is considered null if it is reduced to one owner); Unidad de Apoyo al Sector Privado: 
Unipersonales, MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS, https://www.mef.gub.uy/5342/8/ 
areas/unipersonales-Inversores,Empresas.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2018), (noting that while Uruguay recognizes 
“Empresas Unipersonales,” which translates to “Individual Companies,” they are not considered to be legally separate 
from their owners, and the owner is fully responsible for all obligations of the company). 
159 LGSM cap. XIV. 
160 Law No. 19.550, Mar. 30, 1984, [25397] B.O. 2 (Arg.), http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/ 
infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/25553/texact.htm [hereinafter LGS Argentina]. 
161 Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22. 
162 Law No. 19857, Autoriza el Establecimiento de Empresas Individuales de Responsabilidad Limitada, Enero 
24, 2003, D.O. (Chile), https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=207588 [hereinafter Law No. 19857 Chile]. 
163 Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19. 
164 See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11. 
165 Id. 
166 Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126. 
167 See LSC Uruguay, supra note 158. 
168 Decreto por el que Se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley General de Sociedades 
Mercantiles, supra note 25, at 1 (legislative history record showing the timeline of the legal amendment project). 
169 See LGS Argentina, supra note 160, art. 1 (by amendment). 
170 See generally Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22. 
171 Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162 (providing dates and amendment dates at the top of the web page). 
172 See Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19, art. 8 (providing amendment dates in margins). 
173 See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, tit. I, cap. VII (providing amendment dates). Note also that the 
ability of a Sociedad Anónima to survive as a unipersonal structure and the EIRL structure are both included in the 
original version of the law. 
174 While the law governing formation of Panamanian corporations states that two natural-person subscribers 
are required to incorporate in Panama, it is silent on whether all shares can be transferred to a single shareholder after 
incorporation. This is not listed as a reason for dissolution, and total restriction on transfer of shares is prohibited. See 
Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126, arts. 1, 32; id. sec. IX. However, while Law No. 32 governing corporations was 
promulgated in 1927, 1966 is considered as the year that Panama first allowed for unipersonal limited liability entities. 
See Pablo Carlos Barbieri, Las Sociedades Unipersonales en el Código Civil y Comercial, SISTEMA ARGENTINO DE 
INFORMACIÓN JURIDÍCA (2015), http://www.saij.gob.ar/pablo-carlos-bieri-sociedades-unipersonales-codigo-civil-
comercial-dacf150286-2015-04-15/123456789-0abc-defg6820-51fcanirtcod. However, Panamanian law does allow 
for anonymous holding of bearer shares after inscription, and this veil can only be lifted in cases such as money 
laundering. See Boudin, supra note 126, at 181. As such, it appears that this is the most likely answer as to where 
single-shareholder ownership of Panamanian SAs originated, as it does not appear to be from the text of the law 
directly. Due to the lack of registration of bearer shareholders, there would be no real way to know how many 
shareholders exist. 
175 Notably, Panama first directly allowed for a unipersonal limited liability entity in 1966 with the creation of 
the EIRL. See Law No. 24 Panama, supra note 128. However, this law was derogated in 2009. The new law no longer 
recognizes the EIRL and states that Panamanian LLC-equivalents must dissolve if they have less than two shareholders 
for more than sixty business days. See Law No. 4, supra note 128. 
176 LGSM art. 260. 
177 Brochure, Baker & McKenzie, Doing Business in Argentina 2017, at 23 (Mar. 2017), 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/04/bk_dbi_argentina_2017.pdf?la= 
en. 
178 FAQ, Ministerio de Producción, Abrí Tu Empresa SAS Más Fácil: Guía de Usuario 6, 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/sas_guia_usuario.pdf (last visited May 8, 2018). 
179 Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162, art. 1. 
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180 Law No. 20190 Chile, supra note 19, art. 430; see also ¿Qué es una Sociedad por Acciones (SpA)?, 
MISABOGADOS.COM, (Nov. 24, 2014), https://misabogados.com/blog/es/abogado-sociedad-por-acciones. 
181 See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, art. 104; see also id. art. 202 (stating that the SA is able to have 
only one shareholder after incorporation, but two are required to incorporate). 
182 Id. art. 9. 
183 Law No. 32 Panama, supra note 126, art. 1; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
184 LGSM art. 260. 
185 See LGS Argentina, supra note 160, art. 186 (describing information to be provided if a shareholder is a legal 
entity). 
186 FAQ, Ministerio de Producción, supra note 178, at 29. While other commercial entities may be the sole 
shareholder of an SAS, a different SAS may not be the sole shareholder. Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22, art. 39. 
Additionally, companies described in Article 299 of the Argentine General Company Law may not be the only 
shareholder of a SAS, nor may they have more than 30% ownership of a SAS.) Id. 
187 Law No. 19857 Chile, supra note 162, art. 1. 
188 Registro de Empresas y Sociedades: Preguntas Frequentes, MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA FOMENTO Y TURÍSMO, 
https://www.tuempresaenundia.cl/VD/PreguntasFrecuentes.aspx (last visited May 8, 2018) [hereinafter Chile 
Preguntas Frequentes]. 
189 See CÓD. COM. (Costa Rica), supra note 11, art. 102 (referring only to “socios”—which translates to 
“partners”—as those who can own the business, while the EIRL statute makes clear it can only be natural persons). 
190 Id. art. 9. 
191 See Sociedades Anónimas: Preguntas Frecuentes, supra note 126. 
192 LGSM art. 260. 
193 LGS Argentina, supra note 160, art. 164. 
194 Ley 27349 Argentina, supra note 22, art. 34; Mario Eduardo Castro Sammartino, Sociedad por Acciones 
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